arXiv · 2601.22308
Stealthy Poisoning Attacks Bypass Defenses in Regression Settings
Abstract
Regression models are widely used in industrial processes, engineering, and in natural and physical sciences, yet their robustness to poisoning has received less attention. When it has, studies often assume unrealistic threat models and are thus less useful in practice. In this paper, we propose a novel optimal stealthy attack formulation that considers different degrees of detectability and show that it bypasses state-of-the-art defenses. We further propose a new methodology based on normalization of objectives to evaluate different trade-offs between effectiveness and detectability. Finally, we develop a novel defense (BayesClean) against stealthy attacks. BayesClean improves on previous defenses when attacks are stealthy and the number of poisoning points is significant.
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Javier Carnerero-Cano, Luis Muñoz-González, Phillippa Spencer, Emil C. Lupu. 2026-01-29. Stealthy Poisoning Attacks Bypass Defenses in Regression Settings. https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.22308
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