Security bounds for unidimensional discrete-modulated CV-QKD: a Gaussian extremality approach

Abstract

Unidimensional (1D) Gaussian-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols have been proposed as a way to simplify implementation and reduce costs through single-quadrature modulation, requiring only one modulator while maintaining compatibility with standard optical infrastructure. Here, we determine security bounds for 1D discrete-modulated protocol under the Gaussian extremality assumption by extending the method of Ghorai et al. [Phys. Rev. X 9, 021059 (2019)]. We establish the appropriate symmetry arguments to extend the method to the 1D discrete-modulated case, define the physicality zone in which the protocol is allowed to operate, and prove security against collective attacks in the asymptotic regime via semidefinite programming. Our analysis for uniformly distributed coherent states reveals a fundamental limitation: the Gaussian extremality assumption systematically overestimates Eve's information with increasing constellation size, yielding bounds so conservative that secure key extraction becomes impossible for constellations larger than four states, even under ideal conditions. This overestimation worsens with excess noise and restricts viable modulation amplitudes to impractically small values. Unlike two-dimensional (2D) protocols, where Gaussian extremality improves with constellation size, 1D protocols lack the growing phase-space isotropy required for the approximation to remain tight as the constellation grows. Our results expose these limitations and highlight the necessity of alternative methods or optimized non-uniform constellation designs for this class of protocols.