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arXiv · 2604.20737

Decoupling Speculation from Merit: The Identity-Bound Asset Integrity Model (IBAIM) for Sustainable Web3 Gaming

Jinliang Xu
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Abstract

The rapid collapse of decentralized game economies, often characterized by the \textit{death spiral,} remains the most formidable barrier to the mass adoption of Web3 gaming. This paper proposes that the sustainability of an open game economy is predicated on three necessary and sufficient conditions: Anti-Sybil Resilience, Anti-Capital Dominance, and Anti-Inflationary Saturation. The first section establishes a theoretical proof of these conditions, arguing that the absence of any single dimension leads to systemic failure. The second section explores the dialectical relationship between these dimensions, illustrating how unchecked automation and capital-driven monopolies accelerate asset hyperinflation. In the third section, we introduce the Identity-Bound Asset Integrity Model (IBAIM) as a comprehensive technical solution. IBAIM utilizes Zero-Knowledge (ZK) biometric hashing and Account Abstraction (AA) to anchor asset utility to unique human identities through a privacy-preserving and regulatory-compliant architecture. By exogenizing biometric verification to trusted local environments and utilizing Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Identity (zk-PoI), the model ensures absolute user privacy. Furthermore, by implementing an Asymmetric Utility Decay (AUD) engine-whereby assets suffer a vertical 50% utility cliff upon secondary transfer-and an entropy-driven thermodynamic degradation mechanism., the model successfully decouples financial speculation from in-game merit. Finally, we apply this framework to analyze prominent historical failures in the GameFi sector, demonstrating that their collapse was an inevitable consequence of violating these core economic constraints. Our findings suggest that trading a degree of asset liquidity for system integrity is the only viable path toward long-term economic viability in decentralized virtual worlds.

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BibTeXRIS

Jinliang Xu. 2026-04-22. Decoupling Speculation from Merit: The Identity-Bound Asset Integrity Model (IBAIM) for Sustainable Web3 Gaming. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20737

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