Learning Without Adversarial Training: A Physics-Informed Neural Network for Secure Power System State Estimation under False Data Injection Attacks

Abstract

Power System State Estimation (PSSE) converts geographically distributed measurements into the voltage magnitudes and phase angles needed for grid monitoring and control. Learned estimators can perform this mapping rapidly, but model-aware False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) may corrupt their inputs while retaining AC plausibility and residual-based stealth. Physics-Informed Neural Networks (PINNs) limit candidate states through power-flow consistency; however, their robustness depends on balancing supervised and physics losses whose scales and gradient contributions evolve during training. This paper proposes a PINN that jointly learns homoscedastic uncertainty parameters and uses them to adapt the two objectives. The formulation assigns trainable log-uncertainties to the active-power, reactive-power, voltage, and angle losses while safeguarding against an underweighted physics objective. The estimator is trained only on clean steady-state data and is evaluated, without adversarial retraining, under baseline state-distortion and stricter residual-profile-matching regimes on the IEEE~118-bus system. Accuracy is measured against the uncompromised system state. Relative to a fixed-weight PINN, dynamic weighting reduces overall Mean Absolute Error (MAE) by $55\%$ while also improving voltage- and angle-estimation accuracy. The results show that learning the physics/data balance from clean data improves robustness to unseen FDIAs.