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arXiv · 2605.00921

Implicit Evaluation Under Minimal Information: Hierarchical Component Selection from One-Bit Feedback

Abstract

A selector that allocates work across opaque components must evaluate them without being told how they performed. We study the least communication that suffices. Each parent maintains an allocation vector over its children and updates it from outcomes by proportional redistribution. Each child reads the sign of its own allocation change, one bit per round it is selected, so no evaluation message crosses the parent-child boundary. (1) The update preserves the simplex with strict positivity. (2) Conditional on being selected, a child's sign is exactly the root outcome at every depth, a sufficient statistic. The conditioning is necessary. (3) Under interiority a single selector has a unique interior equilibrium, exact and closed-form for N=2, with almost sure convergence under decreasing steps. For general N an equi-ratio condition gives an explicit affine equilibrium. (4) The linearised mean flow has real, strictly negative tangent eigenvalues with explicit bounds for all N >= 2. (5) The mean flow converges globally. An explicit potential, up to normalisation the KL divergence between the failure and slack distributions, decreases at a rate equal to the variance of the equi-ratio statistic. Without interiority the rule drops exactly the children below the surviving support's threshold. (6) The update law composes along a single active path, since ancestors select a node's active rounds but do not alter a realised signal. No joint convergence theorem for a hierarchy whose levels adapt simultaneously is claimed. (7) The one-bit interface admits exactly four deterministic memoryless distortions, and at a single selector passing the bit on unchanged delivers strictly higher mean quality upward than negation or constant transmission. Illustrations on synthetic hierarchies up to 16,384 leaves and three real datasets (3.4 billion comparisons, no mismatches) are consistent with the theory.

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BibTeXRIS

Joss Armstrong. 2026-04-30. Implicit Evaluation Under Minimal Information: Hierarchical Component Selection from One-Bit Feedback. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.00921

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