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arXiv · 2605.12191

Sure-almost-sure and Sure-limit-sure Window Mean Payoff in Markov Decision Processes

Abstract

Given rationals $\alpha$ and $\beta$, the sure-almost-sure problem for a threshold Boolean objective $\varphi$ in a Markov decision process (MDP) asks if one can simultaneously ensure that all outcomes of the MDP have $\varphi$-value at least $\alpha$ (i.e. sure $\alpha$ satisfaction) and with probability $1$ the outcome has $\varphi$-value at least $\beta$ (i.e. almost-sure $\beta$ satisfaction). The sure-limit-sure problem asks if for all $\varepsilon > 0$ one can simultaneously ensure that all outcomes have $\varphi$-value at least $\alpha$ and with probability at least $1 - \varepsilon$ the outcome has $\varphi$-value at least $\beta$. Moreover, if simultaneous satisfaction of objectives is possible, then one would also like to construct a strategy (for sure-almost-sure) or a family of strategies (for sure-limit-sure) that achieves this. In this paper, we solve the sure-almost-sure and sure-limit-sure problems for window mean-payoff objectives. The window mean-payoff objective strengthens the standard mean-payoff objective by requiring that eventually, from every point in the infinite run, the average payoff becomes greater than a given threshold within a finite window length. We study two variants of window mean payoff: in the fixed variant, the window length $\ell$ is given, while in the bounded variant, the length is not given but is required to be bounded throughout the run. We show that the sure-almost-sure problem and the sure-limit-sure problem are both in P for the fixed variant (if $\ell$ is given in unary) and are both in NP $\cap$ coNP for the bounded variant, matching the computational complexity of sure satisfaction and almost-sure satisfaction when considered separately for these objectives. We also give bounds for the memory requirement of winning strategies for all considered problems.

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BibTeXRIS

Pranshu Gaba, Shibashis Guha. 2026-05-12. Sure-almost-sure and Sure-limit-sure Window Mean Payoff in Markov Decision Processes. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12191

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