arXiv · 2605.17412
Module Lattice Security (Part IV): Probabilistic Polynomial Quantum Attack on Module-LWE over 2-Power Cyclotomics
Abstract
We present a quantum attack on ML-KEM and related 2-power cyclotomic lattice schemes. Combining with Parts I-III, we provide an algorithm and verify the resulting approximation factor satisfies $\gamma\le 21 < q/2=1664.5$ for ML-KEM-1024, with a success probability $\ge 0.99$. We apply a tower decomposition of the Principal Ideal Problem (PIP) through the chain $\Q\subset \Q(\zeta_8)\subset\cdots\subset \Q(\zeta_{2^k})$ which yields a polynomial-time quantum algorithm costing $O(n^3 \log^2 n)$ gates, $O(n^2 \log n)$ qubits, and poly$(n)$ classical bit operations. We extend the analysis to Falcon, Hawk, and NTRU over 2-power cyclotomic rings with polynomial-time quantum algorithms.
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Ming-Xing Luo. 2026-05-17. Module Lattice Security (Part IV): Probabilistic Polynomial Quantum Attack on Module-LWE over 2-Power Cyclotomics. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.17412
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