arXiv · 2605.21634
bioETH-PRS: Confidential Polygenic Risk Scoring without a Trusted Evaluator via Fully Homomorphic Encryption on a Programmable Blockchain
Abstract
Polygenic risk scores (PRSs) aggregate genetic effect estimates to predict disease susceptibility, yet clinical deployment often exposes raw genotype data to third-party compute infrastructure. Prior homomorphic-encryption approaches, still require trust in a designated evaluator. We present bioETH-PRS, a protocol that replaces that evaluator role with immutable smart contracts on a blockchain supporting Fully Homomorphic Encryption (fhEVM). Using the integer-exact TFHE scheme, bioETH-PRS computes the PRS dot product entirely within the encrypted domain, keeping both genotype dosage vectors and GWAS weight vectors hidden from external parties throughout execution. We introduce a three-step fixed-point quantisation scheme for representing signed GWAS weights as unsigned 64-bit integers, achieving machine-epsilon reconstruction accuracy on validated fixtures. A four-contract architecture separates data custody, model publication, computation, and output release, and supports both a classic chunked path and a streaming path, with the latter reducing mock-measured gas by 37%. An on-chain noisy output oracle emits an encrypted noisy-score handle and a publicly decryptable ternary category, reducing raw score exposure and probing risk. Prototype evaluation on real GWAS fixtures confirms linear gas scaling and suggests that the approach may be cost-competitive in low-gas deployment environments.
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Kimon Antonios Provatas, Christos Galanopoulos, Ilias Georgakopoulos-Soares. 2026-05-20. bioETH-PRS: Confidential Polygenic Risk Scoring without a Trusted Evaluator via Fully Homomorphic Encryption on a Programmable Blockchain. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.21634
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