Human Vulnerability Assessment in Cybersecurity: A Systematic Literature Review of Methods, Models, and Instruments

Dimitra Papatsaroucha; Stavroula Psaroudaki; Eleftheria Vassilaki; Konstantina Pityanou; Michail Alexandros Kourtis; Ilias Politis; Evangelos K. Markakis

arXiv · 2605.22119

Human Vulnerability Assessment in Cybersecurity: A Systematic Literature Review of Methods, Models, and Instruments

Dimitra Papatsaroucha·Stavroula Psaroudaki·Eleftheria Vassilaki·Konstantina Pityanou·Michail Alexandros Kourtis·Ilias Politis·Evangelos K. Markakis

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Abstract

In cybersecurity, vulnerability assessment has typically focused on identifying and measuring vulnerabilities within digital assets and technical infrastructures. However, there is growing recognition that this approach alone is inadequate without a structured examination of the human factor, which is becoming more frequently targeted and manipulated by cyber adversaries. Human vulnerabilities extend beyond individual susceptibility to cyber threats, encompassing a wide array of psychological, cognitive, behavioral, social, and contextual factors that can, whether unintentionally or intentionally, jeopardize the security and integrity of systems and data. Despite this recognition, human vulnerability assessment remains fragmented, often addressed from a static rather than a dynamic perspective, and with limited focus on the ways it propagates across individuals and systems; a growing body of literature has explored specific facets of the issue, including one-time assessments of security behavior, user awareness, and, to a degree, intentional insider threats and their detection. This research offers a systematic literature review (SLR) of Human Vulnerability Assessment (HVA) in cybersecurity, including methods, models, and instruments proposed for the conceptual or practical assessment of human vulnerabilities across various dimensions. Following the PRISMA framework, this review gathers relevant studies published from 2017 to 2025, aiming to investigate whether any assessment methods, models, or instruments exist that address the entire spectrum of human vulnerabilities dynamically. The findings highlight gaps and limitations in current proposed solutions and identify areas for further investigation regarding holistic assessment that simultaneously and dynamically considers the entire spectrum of both the unintentional and intentional dimensions of human vulnerability.

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Dimitra Papatsaroucha, Stavroula Psaroudaki, Eleftheria Vassilaki, Konstantina Pityanou, Michail Alexandros Kourtis, Ilias Politis, Evangelos K. Markakis. 2026-05-21. Human Vulnerability Assessment in Cybersecurity: A Systematic Literature Review of Methods, Models, and Instruments. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.22119

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