Beyond Homophily: Towards Generalized Graph Reconstruction Attack and Defense

Abstract

Graph neural networks (GNNs) are widely deployed on relational data, yet they can leak sensitive or proprietary information about the training graph adjacency, e.g., social ties, transactions, and interactions. This work studies graph reconstruction attacks (GRA), a form of model inversion that reconstructs the training adjacency from a trained GNN, given different levels of attacker-side information. We first provide a systematic characterization of when and why adjacency becomes recoverable through features, labels, embeddings, and predictions, with leakage modulated by graph homophily, heterophily, and the model's inductive bias. Motivated by these findings, we view GNN inference through a Markov chain approximation lens, treating the layered forward computation as a chain of topology-dependent representations. Building on this view, we develop complementary attack and defense methods. On the attack side, we propose MC-GRA (+), which reconstructs the adjacency by optimizing a surrogate adjacency whose GNN-induced representations align with those of the target model at each layer. On the defense side, we propose MC-GPB (+), which suppresses adjacency-dependent information throughout the representation chain while aiming to preserve classification accuracy under a privacy-utility trade-off. Experiments across homophilic/heterophilic graph benchmarks and GNNs show that our attacks improve reconstruction fidelity over prior methods, while our defenses reduce reconstruction success with only minor accuracy loss.