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arXiv · 2606.10720

A Pigouvian Matchmaker Mechanism for De-escalating the AGI Race

Eduard Kapelko
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Abstract

A formal mechanism is presented in which a willing regulator-matchmaker fosters cooperation on resources among participants in the AGI race, collects a Pigouvian tax based on the speed-up it induces, and invests the proceeds into alignment research. The construction is derived in the continuous-time options framework of Tan (2025) in which cooperation is treated as a jump in the underlying asset value of participating players, the Pigouvian component is matched to the marginal effect of increasing expected loss, and the total collected fund endogenizes the rate of learning on safety. It is shown how the framework allows for determining participation and optimal activity levels. Conditions under which it is optimal to enter the market are derived, and it is proven that if the orthogonality condition holds between the supported portfolio and the abilities component, the Suicide Region collapses at finite time, and the upper bound for this time is derived as sum of a deterministic and random term. Finally, if orthogonality is violated, it is proven that enhancing matchmaker capacity does not recover the market's superiority. The construction links research areas including two-sided markets, Pigouvian taxes, self-regulatory organizations, private law enforcement, evolutionary modeling of AI races, real options and option games, measurement of comparative progress and analysis of the Suicide Region.

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BibTeXRIS

Eduard Kapelko. 2026-06-09. A Pigouvian Matchmaker Mechanism for De-escalating the AGI Race. https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.10720

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