Shared Infrastructure Investment and Pricing: Stackelberg Equilibria in Risk-Aware Take-or-Pay Contracts

Amal Sakr; Andrea Araldo; Tamer Başar; Tijani Chahed

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arXiv · 2606.12167

Shared Infrastructure Investment and Pricing: Stackelberg Equilibria in Risk-Aware Take-or-Pay Contracts

Amal Sakr·Andrea Araldo·Tamer Başar·Tijani Chahed

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Abstract

We study a shared infrastructure deployed by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) and used by multiple firms generating revenues through resource usage. We focus on a challenging setting where (i) infrastructure deployment requires substantial upfront investment, which the InP recovers via payments by firms that depend on their uncertain future revenues; (ii) firms' resource usage is jointly influenced by exogenous factors, infrastructure pricing, operational costs, and resource congestion; and (iii) firms exhibit heterogeneous risk aversion. These aspects are typical of emerging technologies, such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC). Yet, their joint effect on the InP's capacity dimensioning and pricing decisions and the firms' usage commitments remains poorly understood. We establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium among the firms. We do so by introducing a Stackelberg game with risk-aware take-or-pay contracting and firm-side operational and congestion costs, in which the InP acts as the leader, while firms act as followers that share the infrastructure and commit upfront to future resource usage under uncertain revenues. Followers' heterogeneous risk aversion is modeled through Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR). We prove the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), in which the followers' decisions constitute a generalized Nash equilibrium, and develop a polynomial-time algorithm that boundedly approximates the SE. We derive a lower bound on the followers' Probability of Profit (PoP). Simulations in a realistic MEC scenario show that higher followers' risk aversion reduces capacity, pricing, and leader profit, while increasing the lower bound on PoP.

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Amal Sakr, Andrea Araldo, Tamer Başar, Tijani Chahed. 2026-06-10. Shared Infrastructure Investment and Pricing: Stackelberg Equilibria in Risk-Aware Take-or-Pay Contracts. https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.12167

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