Positive and Negative Determinant Strategies in Repeated Games with Behavior-Value Inconsistency

Yuan Liu; Yakun Wang; Bin Wu

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arXiv · 2607.00625

Positive and Negative Determinant Strategies in Repeated Games with Behavior-Value Inconsistency

Yuan Liu·Yakun Wang·Bin Wu

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Abstract

Direct reciprocity, based on the repeated interactions, is a fundamental mechanism to promote cooperation. Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies have opened an avenue for unilateral payoff control. However, previous studies neglect internal costs provided what agents do differ from what agents think, which is crucial for decision making of intelligent agents. Motivated by this, we establish a game theoretical framework by assuming that an individual pays the internal cost if the behavior is inconsistent with the internal thought. We prove that ZD strategy does not exist if the cost via behavior-value inconsistency is present. Instead, we find a new class of repeated strategies that enforce a unilateral payoff control, which is termed as positive/negative determinant strategy. The found strategy allows an individual to enforce an affine combination of two individuals' average payoffs above/below zero. Consequently, a focal individual is able to unilaterally control the opponent's payoff below a given value via negative determinant strategy, and a focal individual is able to get more payoff than the opponent via positive determinant strategy. We also find that the control ability of positive/negative determinant strategies is better off than that of ZD strategies. Our work highlights the importance of inconsistency between the behavior and value on payoff control, which is typically absent in classic ZD strategies.

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Yuan Liu, Yakun Wang, Bin Wu. 2026-07-01. Positive and Negative Determinant Strategies in Repeated Games with Behavior-Value Inconsistency. https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.00625

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