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arXiv · 2607.16596

Cold-Start Model Delivery in Kubernetes Inference Serving: An Empirical Study of OCI-Based Distribution and Its Integrity

Georgii Kliukovkin
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Abstract

The startup latency of a model-serving pod on Kubernetes is dominated by one step: delivering the model weights. As models reach the hundred-gigabyte weights of large language models, cold-start delivery time governs the economics of autoscaling and scale-to-zero, yet the dominant mechanisms remain ad-hoc downloads from object storage, with none of the pull caching, digest addressing, or verification Kubernetes provides for container images. We analyze the delivery paths available to a Kubernetes serving platform along two axes: which component pulls the artifact, and whether any admission-time verifier can bind the deployed reference to the arriving bytes. We validate the analysis upstream in KServe, a widely deployed CNCF model-serving platform, by implementing two new delivery paths: oci+native://, which mounts model images as Kubernetes image volumes (KEP-4639), merged upstream, and oci+fetch://, which pulls OCI artifacts inside the storage initializer, under review. We report, to our knowledge, the first controlled comparison of model delivery paths in a Kubernetes serving platform (modelcar sidecars, native image volumes, object-storage download) on artifacts sized to fp16 weights of 1B-, 7B-, and 70B-class models (2-140 GB). Node-cached OCI delivery makes warm replica addition size-independent: 11.7 s for a 70B-class artifact versus 40.7 minutes of re-download over object storage, a 208x difference, while the first cold pull costs up to 2x a plain download, localized to containerd's blob-write-then-unpack double pass. For models on s3://, gs://, or hf:// URIs, where no admission-time verifier observes the bytes, we present a serving-time integrity design proposed to the KServe community: digest pinning and OpenSSF model-signing enforcement in the storage initializer. Streaming hash verification during download adds under 0.1% to delivery time; a post-download pass adds up to 53%.

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Georgii Kliukovkin. 2026-07-18. Cold-Start Model Delivery in Kubernetes Inference Serving: An Empirical Study of OCI-Based Distribution and Its Integrity. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3731156

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