Price of Censorship: Censorship Resistance and Throughput under Rational Concurrent Proposers

Abstract

Censorship resistance is the defining advantage of blockchains over their centralized counterparts. Yet block proposers censor transactions for many reasons, from legal consequences to economic incentives. We study economically-incentivized censorship, modeled by an adversary who bribes proposers to exclude a target transaction, and define the economic censorship resistance (eCR) of a transaction as the adversary's expected cost of successful censorship divided by the user's expected payment for inclusion. Single-proposer systems are structurally weak by this measure: under a first-price auction the adversary need only match the user's bid, and fee burning pushes eCR to a few percent of what the user pays. We therefore turn to multiple concurrent proposers (MCP), where block capacity is divided among $n$ proposers and the block is the union of their sub-blocks. While MCP can substantially increase the cost of censorship by requiring the adversary to bribe many proposers, it also introduces transaction duplication, reducing throughput. The resulting trade-off depends critically on the transaction fee mechanism (TFM), which determines how fees are shared among competing proposers. We create a game theoretic model where validators construct blocks from a shared mempool, subject to an adversary's bribery attempt. We provide an algorithm that solves for the mixed equilibrium of a given mempool, which is characterized by the probability of including each transaction. This algorithm works for a wide class of TFMs, and allows us to calculate the expected throughput and censorship resistance for any bid distribution. We then use simulations to show how the eCR and throughput vary as the number of proposers increases. We compare three TFMs, finding that the duplication-penalizing TFM dominates the others across many settings. We also validate our findings with empirical Ethereum data.