arXiv · 2608.04924
On the dimensions of correlated equilibrium polytopes of generic games
Abstract
In this paper, we study the dimension of the correlated equilibrium polytope of finite games. Under the oriented-matroid notion of genericity, we prove that if a generic game is not full-dimensional, then there exists a subgame whose correlated equilibrium polytope is affinely isomorphic to that of the original game. This settles and generalizes an earlier conjecture of Brandenburg, Hollering, and Portakal (2024). Moreover, we show that the existence of a correlated equilibrium whose slices are all non-zero implies that the correlated equilibrium polytope is either full-dimensional or a singleton.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Explore connections, maps & timelines
Jan Draisma, Linda Hoyer, Irem Portakal. 2026-08-05. On the dimensions of correlated equilibrium polytopes of generic games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04924
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.