Asymmetries in Peer Effects

Aristide Houndetoungan; Mathieu Lambotte

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arXiv · 2608.09219

Asymmetries in Peer Effects

Aristide Houndetoungan·Mathieu Lambotte

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Abstract

Individuals are often influenced by their peers because deviating from prevailing behavior entails social costs. However, existing peer effects models typically assume that individuals respond similarly to peers who perform better or worse than they do. This paper introduces a novel structural model of asymmetric peer effects in which conformity incentives depend on whether individuals perform below or above each of their peers. We establish that the model admits a unique equilibrium and show that its parameters can be identified and estimated through simple moment conditions. Applying our method to several student outcomes, we uncover strong evidence of asymmetries in peer effects. We then demonstrate that these asymmetries are highly policy-relevant by studying targeted interventions under budget constraints. Ignoring asymmetries leads to inefficient treatment allocation and substantial welfare losses, reducing welfare to levels comparable to those in a benchmark without social interactions.

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BibTeX RIS

Aristide Houndetoungan, Mathieu Lambotte. 2026-08-10. Asymmetries in Peer Effects. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09219

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