arXiv · 2608.21608
Revenue and Social Welfare Maximization in Service Systems: Independent vs Grouped Customers
Abstract
The revenue maximization problem in service systems with strategic customers is a central problem in the thread of Rational Queueing literature. The standard modeling assumption is that customers act independently and, therefore, the situation is modeled as a game among the customers and the service provider. In the present work, we focus on the case where the customers are grouped and controlled by their leader and the situation becomes a game between the customers' leader and the service provider. We examine the effect of customers' cooperation for the join-or-balk dilemma at the unobservable single-server Markovian queue and present the impact on the social welfare and service provider's revenue.
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Apostolos Burnetas, Antonis Economou. 2026-08-21. Revenue and Social Welfare Maximization in Service Systems: Independent vs Grouped Customers. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.21608
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