Targeted Power System Frequency Attack via the Selection of Maliciously Controlled Inverters

Abstract

This paper studies how an adversary can execute a power system frequency attack by choosing the most effective subset of inverter-based resources (IBRs) as malicious control nodes. During the attack, the adversary controls the attacking devices to destabilize a group of designated target generators. The attack is designed by introducing an unstable oscillatory mode whose eigenvector has large components at the target generators and small components at the compromised IBRs. We formalize the optimal attacker selection problem and present an equivalent mixed-integer quadratically constrained program (MIQCP). To address this combinatorial nonconvex problem, we develop two heuristic algorithms by introducing a ranking metric. The attack process is demonstrated on a modified WSCC 179-bus system, with results verified through nonlinear dynamic simulations. We show that the proposed heuristics find optimal attacking sets in a majority of evaluated scenarios while significantly reducing the required computational time. Scenarios from the ACTIVSg500 system are used to further support our results. Finally, we discuss how selecting different eigenvalues, targets, and numbers of compromised devices impact the attack's severity.