Trust-Aware Adaptive Disclosure for Inference Privacy Preservation in Multi-Agent Networks

Puspanjali Ghoshal; Tobias J. Oechtering

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arXiv · 2609.05340

Trust-Aware Adaptive Disclosure for Inference Privacy Preservation in Multi-Agent Networks

Puspanjali Ghoshal·Tobias J. Oechtering

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Abstract

Agent based systems are increasingly deployed in information critical systems including healthcare management systems, and smart grids. In this paper, we consider a multi-agent system where each agent has a latent goal that needs to be kept hidden from observing adversaries. More specifically, this paper studies privacy-preserving consensus in networked multi-agent systems under goal inference attacks. We propose a Trust-Aware Privacy Control framework that adapts message disclosure based on the dynamic trust relationships between agents. The proposed method controls information release using a trust-dependent stochastic policy. This enables a tradeoff between consensus performance and privacy preservation. Experiments demonstrate that the proposed method reduces adversarial goal inference accuracy compared to representative baselines, while maintaining competitive consensus utility, thereby highlighting the effectiveness of trust-aware mechanisms in privacy preservation of the agents in multi-agent systems.

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Puspanjali Ghoshal, Tobias J. Oechtering. 2026-09-04. Trust-Aware Adaptive Disclosure for Inference Privacy Preservation in Multi-Agent Networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05340

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