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arXiv · 2609.06123

Optimal harvesting under annuity and compound interest laws: economic-ecological trade-offs in a logistic growth model

Anurag Sau·Sujayan Gupta·Uttam Ghosh·Sabyasachi Bhattacharya
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Abstract

The relationship between investment policy associated with species growth profile is essential in seeking the most appropriate strategy for a policymaker. Balancing maximum profit with the sustainability of species remains a central issue in both ecological and economic contexts. This study presents a comparative analysis of two interest principles, annuity and compounding, within the framework of optimal control. Various investment policies are examined from the perspective of capital theory, incorporating concepts such as future value, accumulation function, and force of interest, each contributing to the formulation of an optimal control strategy. Our analysis is based on a one dimensional logistic model incorporating linear harvesting. Key parameters include the species growth rate and interest rate, and optimality is evaluated with respect to these variables. Using Pontryagins Maximum Principle, we derive the optimal harvesting policies under both discounting laws and characterize the resulting steady state equilibria. The principal finding indicates that for species with low intrinsic growth rates and low annual interest rates, the annuity law of interest yields optimal outcomes. Conversely, for any annual interest rate, species exhibiting moderate or high growth rates maximize profit under the compound law of interest. The study also addresses maximum net revenue and optimal strategies for varying growth rates under each interest law.

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Anurag Sau, Sujayan Gupta, Uttam Ghosh, Sabyasachi Bhattacharya. 2026-09-05. Optimal harvesting under annuity and compound interest laws: economic-ecological trade-offs in a logistic growth model. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06123

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