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arXiv · 2609.12543

Stable Improvement Cycle Mechanism Versus Efficiency-adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism beyond Weak Priority Orders

Minoru Kitahara·Yasunori Okumura
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Abstract

This paper compares the stable improvement cycles (SIC) mechanism of Erdil and Ergin (2008) with the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) mechanism of Kesten (2010) in school choice problems with incomplete priorities. When school priorities are strict partial orders, we show that the EADA mechanism produces a constrained efficient matching. Combined with earlier results for the SIC mechanism, this establishes the outcome equivalence of the two mechanisms: the sets of matchings attainable under them coincide. We then move beyond transitivity and consider acyclic priority relations. On this broader domain, neither mechanism is guaranteed to produce a constrained efficient matching, but their failures take opposite forms. The SIC mechanism may under-improve: its outcome is always stable but may be Pareto dominated by another stable matching. By contrast, the EADA mechanism may over-improve: its outcome is never Pareto dominated by any stable matching but may itself be unstable.

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BibTeXRIS

Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura. 2026-09-11. Stable Improvement Cycle Mechanism Versus Efficiency-adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism beyond Weak Priority Orders. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12543

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