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arXiv · 2609.13650

Online Fair Division: Pushing the Frontier of Approximate Proportionality

Abstract

Online fair division captures allocation problems in which indivisible resources arrive over time and must be assigned before future resources are known. Understanding what fairness remains achievable when allocation decisions are immediate and irrevocable is a fundamental question in this setting. We study deterministic online allocation among $n$ agents with nonnegative additive valuations, where the number of goods is unknown and the adversary can adapt to previous allocation decisions. We focus on proportionality up to one good (PROP1) and examine how advance future information affects the achievable guarantees. In the setting without additional information, we answer an open question in Choo et al. that asks whether a nontrivial deterministic approximation for PROP1 can be obtained. In particular, we present a deterministic algorithm that guarantees $Ω(1/\log(nm))$-PROP1, where $m$ is the number of goods. Moreover, we complement this result by showing that, for every fixed $n$ and all sufficiently large $m$, every deterministic algorithm has an instance with $m$ goods on which its PROP1 factor is $O(\log\log m/\log m)$. We also study the setting where the algorithm knows in advance the maximum item value (MIV) for every agent. With MIV information, we give a deterministic algorithm with competitive ratio 1/2, improving the $1/n$ guarantee in Choo et al. We also show that no deterministic algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio arbitrarily close to one, even for two agents with exact MIV information.

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BibTeXRIS

Yingjian Du, Ankang Sun. 2026-09-12. Online Fair Division: Pushing the Frontier of Approximate Proportionality. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13650

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