One-Shot Information Hiding and Compound Wiretap Channels

Abstract

In recent years, due to the growing reliance on large amounts of data that are communicated, analyzed, and utilized, which inherently contain sensitive and personal information, secrecy and privacy in communication have become increasingly important. We present nonasymptotic information-theoretic analyses of two fundamental secrecy problems under channel uncertainties: the information hiding problem and the compound wiretap channel. The former admits a game-theoretic formulation, where one party (an information hider and a decoder) seeks to embed secret messages into a host signal for later reconstruction, while the opposing party (an attacker) attempts to remove or degrade the embedded information. The latter generalizes Wyner's wiretap channel by allowing multiple potential channel states. The information hiding problem concerns active attacks during data transmission, while the compound wiretap channel addresses passive eavesdropping and information leakage. The two problems, both of which consider channels with uncertainties, can be studied under a unified framework by utilizing a covering argument and the Poisson matching lemma by Li and Anantharam. We derive novel one-shot achievability results for both problems that are applicable to any source distribution and any class of channels (not necessarily memoryless or ergodic), and that apply to both discrete and continuous cases. We also show that existing asymptotic results on both problems can be recovered by applying our results to discrete memoryless channels.