arXiv · 2609.27022
Adversarial Attacks and Identity Leakage in De-Identification Systems: An Empirical Study
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the impact of adversarial attacks on identity encoders within a realistic de-identification framework. Our experiments show that the transferability of attacks transfers from an external surrogate model to the system model (e.g., CosFace to ArcFace) allows the adversary to cause identity information to leak in a sufficiently sensitive face recognition system. We present experimental evidence and propose strategies to mitigate this vulnerability. Specifically, we show how fine-tuning on adversarial examples helps to mitigate this effect for distortion-based attacks (i.e., snow, fog, etc.), while a simple low-pass filter can attenuate the effect of adversarial noise without affecting the de-identified images. Our mitigation results in a de-identification system that preserves its functionality while being significantly more robust to adversarial noise.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Explore connections, maps & timelines
Felix Rosberg, Cristofer Englund, Eren Erdal Aksoy, Fernando Alonso-Fernandez. 2026-09-22. Adversarial Attacks and Identity Leakage in De-Identification Systems: An Empirical Study. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27022
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.