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arXiv · 2609.27367

Seal, Then Sample: Sampled Layerwise Proofs for Verifiable LLM Inference from GPT-2 to 70B

Abstract

Verifying outsourced language-model inference requires a precisely identified computation and an audit whose cost a service can afford. We present Sampled Layerwise Proofs (SLP), a protocol and prototype that commits the boundary activations of every chunk of an inference trace, absorbs all commitments before any challenge is drawn, and then proves a verifier-selected subset of chunks together with the chunks that bind the prompt and the answer. Audit coverage becomes a runtime parameter over one set of commitments: on a TinyLlama-1.1B trace, proving seven of 47 chunks takes 22.0% of the time and 6.8% of the proof size of proving all 47. Because proof cost is dominated by weights rather than tokens, SLP packs concurrent requests into one trace under a block-diagonal causal mask and binds the prompt and answer of each request to its slot. Twelve packed requests are proved in 181.9 s, 6.5 times less than twelve separate proofs at the measured single-proof cost, and a simulated service proves twelve requests at 30.6 s per request with 0.6 s of verification each, rejecting a tampered answer. Disk-backed integer weights and streamed polynomial commitments let a single Llama-2-70B run complete on a 2 TB CPU host: 163 chunks sealed, five proved, a 4.34 MiB proof in 1,259 s, verified in 46.3 s without the weights. The proven object is a fixed-point canonical model; we trace a severe fidelity loss to the residual-stream bit width, repair it with an LLM-aware observer, and measure 84.8-84.9% argmax agreement with the floating-point reference over 334,705 WikiText-2 test positions. The limits are stated as precisely: guarantees cover proven chunks only, a fixed invalid chunk in the 70B setting is covered with probability 3/161, a manifest-only Fiat-Shamir schedule can be ground at 12.5 ms per attempt and needs an externally ordered challenge, and all measurements use a test reference string.

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BibTeXRIS

Youki Lim, Sam Yong. 2026-09-23. Seal, Then Sample: Sampled Layerwise Proofs for Verifiable LLM Inference from GPT-2 to 70B. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27367

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