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arXiv · 2609.28699

zkSAS: Practical Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Verifiable Spectrum Access Management

Nishat F. Purbasha·Ifteher Alom·Eric W. Burger·Y. Thomas Hou·Wenjing Lou·Yang Xiao
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Abstract

Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) through the Spectrum Access Systems (SAS) elevates spectral efficiency, yet existing centralized models face allocation logic opaqueness and a lack of independent verifiability. While blockchain-based SAS architectures offer transparency and verifiability by default, they introduce critical privacy risks and prohibitive on-chain computational overhead. We introduce zkSAS, a practical zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) system designed to address the verifiability and privacy gaps in SAS deployments, with direct applicability to both the existing CBRS SAS model and blockchain-based SAS models. The system features a suite of ZKP circuits, encompassing proofs of allocation constraint validity and proofs of move list validity to verify that channel assignments and move list-based incumbent protection measures, respectively, adhere to regulatory constraints without exposing sensitive user data. Comprehensive evaluation of our prototype in both centralized and blockchain-based settings indicates that while proof generation scales with spectrum user population, verification remains lightweight and constant-time. We envision that zkSAS offers a scalable and practical path to secure, verifiable dynamic spectrum sharing.

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Nishat F. Purbasha, Ifteher Alom, Eric W. Burger, Y. Thomas Hou, Wenjing Lou, Yang Xiao. 2026-09-23. zkSAS: Practical Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Verifiable Spectrum Access Management. https://doi.org/10.1109/dyspan69846.2026.11571163

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