Revisiting Certified Defense with Differential Privacy on Vision Transformers

Abstract

Certified defenses that incorporate differential privacy have proven effective on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), furnishing rigorous robustness guarantees against norm-bounded adversaries. However, the certified robustness behavior of Pixel Differential Privacy (PixelDP) remains largely unexplored with the self-attention architecture now dominating the deep-learning landscape. Given that the Transformer has a profound impact on our daily applications from the digital world to the physical world, it is crucial to study certified robustness through differential-privacy-style stability. To fill this research gap, we revisit this construction in Vision Transformers and identify a failure mode that is largely hidden in the convolutional setting. When noise is injected after the patch embedding, the Laplace mechanism with the inherited grouped $\ell_1$ sensitivity bound collapses to chance-level accuracy across noise scales, whereas the Gaussian mechanism remains trainable. This contrast isolates the source of failure: not the injected noise itself, but the geometry of the sensitivity constraint. We show that the attenuation induced by the inherited $Δ_{1,1}$ projection increases with layer width and kernel size according to a random-matrix scale $C/(\sqrt{M}+\sqrt{N})$. Replacing the $\ell_1$-type constraint with a spectral-norm constraint eliminates the collapse across datasets and architectures, but creates a fundamental obstacle: the repaired models no longer satisfy the sensitivity condition required by the standard Laplace certificate. We resolve this mismatch by deriving a dimension-free $(\varepsilon,\ δ)$-privacy guarantee for the Laplace mechanism under $\ell_2$ sensitivity through concentration of the privacy loss.