Backward-Compatible Tag-Based PHY Authentication for Secure WLAN Sensing

Abstract

Driven by ongoing standardization efforts, Wi-Fi sensing has recently emerged as a promising functionality within wireless local area networks (WLANs). However, due to the use of standard null-data packets (NDPs) to estimate the channel, conventional Wi-Fi sensing systems are susceptible to spoofing attacks. To counter this threat, we propose a lightweight tag-embedding scheme that enables physical layer authentication (PLA) of sensing signals. Specifically, a secret tag is superimposed onto the orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) channel sounding signal, allowing legitimate WLAN receivers to verify signal authenticity and detect spoofed transmissions. A unique tag is generated for each transmission to avoid replay attacks, and the subcarrier occupancy of each tag is randomized to minimize the mean channel estimation error at each subcarrier. Simulation results demonstrate reliable authentication performance with a 95% correct authentication rate at a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 10dB, while introducing an additional channel estimation error of only 0.52dB at legacy receivers that are unaware of the embedded tag. Thus, our proposed scheme provides an effective and backward-compatible countermeasure against spoofing attacks, enhancing the trustworthiness of future Wi-Fi sensing systems.