Blackwell Boundaries

Shuo Li Liu

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arXiv · 2609.35062

Blackwell Boundaries

Shuo Li Liu

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Abstract

We give a finite simplex theorem. When the number of states equals the number of source signals and the source posterior likelihood-ratio vectors form a simplex, Blackwell dominance is characterized by a universal barycentric-coordinate condition. We also give an explicit countable-state, countable-signal diagnostic-monitor theorem with a closed-form universal criterion and a closed-form garbling; tensorization yields dominance at every sample size. Finally, we provide a three-state, two-signal counterexample to the sufficiency conjectured by Mu, Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz for their many-state moment-generating-function conditions for large-sample Blackwell dominance. The pair satisfies strict comparisons on both parameter domains, all ordered Kullback-Leibler inequalities, bounded likelihood ratios and pairwise genericity, but dominance fails at every positive sample size. The finite theorem, obstruction, and continuum inequalities are verified in Lean 4.30 with Mathlib; the countable diagnostic proof is given analytically.

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Shuo Li Liu. 2026-09-28. Blackwell Boundaries. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35062

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