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arXiv · 2609.36207

What is Physics For? Why Classical Physics is not the Limit of Quantum Mechanics

Adam Frank·Jacques L. Pienaar·Michel Bitbol·Harald Wiltsche·Gabriela Barreto Lemos·Marcelo Gleiser·Marcus Appleby
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Abstract

Quantum mechanics is justifiably held to be the most successful physical theory ever created; yet no universally accepted interpretation of its mathematical formalism exists after a century of debate. We examine the specific claim that classical physics stands as the low-action limit of quantum mechanics, arguing that the deep interpretive difficulties exposed by the quantum formalism, the measurement problem, the subject-object divide, and the nature of scientific representation, were already latent in classical physics, constituting what we call a blind spot of objectivity. Taking quantum theory as an invitation to re-examine the implicit metaphysical commitments bundled with 'classical physics', we explore two key issues-the objective/subjective split and the nature of theoretical representation-and argue that quantum mechanics does not represent a break with classical physics per se but rather brings previously unacknowledged philosophical assumptions into the limelight. We discuss the London-Bauer interpretation and QBism as exemplars of interpretations that embrace this broader reconceptualisation.

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Adam Frank, Jacques L. Pienaar, Michel Bitbol, Harald Wiltsche, Gabriela Barreto Lemos, Marcelo Gleiser, Marcus Appleby. 2026-09-28. What is Physics For? Why Classical Physics is not the Limit of Quantum Mechanics. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36207

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