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arXiv · 2610.00183

Two Models of Event Finality: Functional Alignment, Contestability, and Empirical Comparability on Polymarket and Kalshi

Maksym Nechepurenko
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Abstract

Event contracts reach economic finality through different institutional paths. Polymarket distinguishes oracle adjudication, adapter consumption, Conditional Tokens payout recording, technical redeemability, and optional holder redemption. Kalshi distinguishes venue determination, public finalization, lifecycle messages, and exact REST settlement fields. Resolved, settled, and finalized do not themselves define comparable endpoints. We define a mechanism-aware comparison certificate using functional roles rather than common labels. A scalar cross-venue duration is admissible only when payoff semantics, endpoint functions, calendar support, censoring, observation grades, and dependence units are jointly aligned. We separate exact paired, interval-qualified paired, and standardized unpaired estimands. Polymarket evidence contains 108,638 exact-linked conditions, 99,283 protocol payout records, 92,158 observed redemptions of any amount, and 91,817 observed positive-payout redemptions. Kalshi evidence contains 152,694 ordinary markets reconstructed as at risk at the enrollment boundary and 7,611,594 exact MVE market objects. Exact public endpoints cover 71,657 ordinary markets and 7,357,576 MVE objects. Exact determination-to-endpoint pairs total 70,979 for ordinary markets and 126,806 for MVE. These are Kalshi-native finality results, not Polymarket-Kalshi estimates. REST endpoint completeness can be high when exact lifecycle paths are sparse, and transport gaps can preserve two exact clocks while preventing claims about intermediate revisions. Current MVE timer fields do not identify historical version-consistent timer rules, and public finalization does not identify member cash. Cross-venue numerical comparison remains blocked until Paper 7.3 supplies blind first/stable decidability clocks and a semantic/calendar registry establishes genuinely comparable events and endpoints.

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Maksym Nechepurenko. 2026-09-17. Two Models of Event Finality: Functional Alignment, Contestability, and Empirical Comparability on Polymarket and Kalshi. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7421338

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