ZoneClaw: Mitigating Persistent Memory Attacks by Establishing Memory-Zoning in OpenClaw-Style Computer-Use Agents

Abstract

Computer-use agents increasingly operate as long-running assistants through persistent workspace memory, which OpenClaw-style CUAs realize as automatically reloaded files that hold user instructions, system summaries, and external claims at the same privilege level. Here, remembering a claim confers authority over later behavior. This enables a persistent memory attack, in which an attacker who controls only benign-looking external content induces the CUA to record attacker-favored claims during a legitimate task, and those claims later govern benign tasks the attacker never touches. The attack chain extends "malicious context -> malicious response" into "malicious context -> memory injection -> malicious execution", making this a cross-environment threat. Existing defenses studied intervene either before content enters memory or at the action it later induces, not whether stored content may guide action. We propose ZoneClaw, which separates persistence from authority by replacing flat workspace memory with hierarchical trust zones carrying explicit authority levels. External claims persist in a low-trust zone and acquire action-guiding authority only by crossing an explicit authority boundary, at which promotion is cross-checked against zones the attacker cannot directly write. Role-specific processes of asymmetric privilege enforce this boundary, ensuring that no process both ingests external content and acts outward. Across four attack scenarios, two injection settings, and four backbones, ZoneClaw drives ASR from 372/480 to 6/480 while retaining utility in 458/480 trials, and remains effective against some defense-aware attackers. Attacker claims still persist in low-trust memory yet rarely cross the authority boundary, showing that ZoneClaw withholds authority rather than refusing to learn from the environment. Our code is available at: https://github.com/euph00/ZoneClaw-code.