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arXiv · 2610.02435

SoK: Stablecoins in the Quantum Era

Panagiotis Chatzigiannis·Navid Alamati·Suvradip Chakraborty·Duc V. Le
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Abstract

Stablecoins support payments, trading, collateral, and cross-chain settlement across the digital-asset ecosystem. They also concentrate value behind issuer, custody, upgrade, oracle, and bridge keys while inheriting the quantum vulnerabilities of host-chain accounts, consensus, rollups, and privacy systems. This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on post-quantum stablecoins. We develop a stablecoin-specific threat model, map cryptographic dependencies to monetary control surfaces, and classify migration choices along three dimensions: who can authorize a change, where the change must occur, and whether it is hybrid, post-quantum native, or an encapsulation of a classical component. We emphasize an authority-liability gap: the party able to migrate a component is often different from the holders, exchanges, protocols, or issuers that bear the loss if it fails. We review the relevant cryptographic primitives, but distinguish general blockchain failures from their stablecoin-specific effects. We also examine recent blockchain and issuer-controlled interoperability proposals, and relate migration choices to redemption, continuity, and intervention requirements under current stablecoin regulation. Our findings identify open problems in aggregate and threshold authorization, operation-specific security levels and costs, dormant and wrapped supply, private and compliance-enabled transfers, and measurement of quantum-vulnerable stablecoin exposure.

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Panagiotis Chatzigiannis, Navid Alamati, Suvradip Chakraborty, Duc V. Le. 2026-10-01. SoK: Stablecoins in the Quantum Era. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02435

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