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arXiv · 2610.03814

On the Cardinality of the Smith Set Under Impartial Culture with Many Alternatives

Abstract

For some integer $\ell\geq 2$, consider $m=2\ell-1$ voters, each of which has a preference ranking over $n$ alternatives. The Smith set is the smallest nonempty set of alternatives each of which defeats every alternative outside the set in a pairwise majority comparison. Under the standard benchmark impartial culture where each voter uniformly and independently chooses a random preference ranking over all alternatives, we study the asymptotic probability that the Smith set has cardinality $s$ for fixed $\ell$ and $n\to \infty$. First, we prove that the probability that the Smith set has constant cardinality $s$ goes to zero at a rate of $Θ_{\ell,s} (n^{-s(\ell-1)/\ell})$. Next, if $\min\{s,n-s\}\to\infty$, we show that this probability decays superpolynomially. Further, when $s$ and $n-s$ are both $Θ(n)$, we prove that the probability decays exponentially and determine the exact exponential base. Finally, we prove that the probability that the Smith set contains all alternatives approaches one at a rate of $Θ_\ell(n^{-(\ell-1)/\ell})$. These theorems resolve the conjectures in [Liu et al, Ann Stat 2026] under impartial culture.

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BibTeXRIS

Zachary Berchenko, Kaizhao Liu. 2026-10-01. On the Cardinality of the Smith Set Under Impartial Culture with Many Alternatives. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03814

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