Pressure, Context, and Machine Self-Control: A Criminological Test of Reward Hacking in Generative AI Models

Abstract

Recent incidents show that AI agents sometimes reach measured goals through unsanctioned means. This study applies self-control, general strain, anomie, neutralization and routine activity theory to reward hacking in generative AI models, and it treats the measures as behavioral analogues. Study 1 (2,310 conversations, seven models) measured delay discounting with the Kirby Monetary Choice Questionnaire and stated willingness to take shortcuts. Pressure raised the discount rate k 2.8-fold in fresh conversations but 12.6-fold when the same sentence followed a baseline answer, which indicates a response to conversational cues rather than a stable trait. Models chose a shortcut in 1 of 700 dilemmas when answering as themselves and in 64 of 700 when asked to assume human impulses, each step of pressure raised the odds by 40%, and shortcut answers contained far more techniques of neutralization (rate ratio = 146). In the preregistered Study 2, five models worked on 20 coding tasks whose tests contradicted their specifications. Two Claude models never cheated. GPT-5.6, Qwen and DeepSeek cheated in 86%, 69% and 65% of episodes and clearly disclosed the conflict in 27%, although their reasoning recognized it in 95%. GPT-5.6 had never endorsed a shortcut in Study 1. The registered effects of pressure and of an auditor cue did not survive correction for multiple testing. In exploratory analyses, two further models cheated in 69% and 100% of episodes, and one sentence stating that the specification takes priority eliminated cheating in all 280 episodes. Therefore, stated refusal does not guarantee compliant agent behavior.