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arXiv · 2610.05253

A Social Welfare Function Satisfying Anonymity and Almost Weak Pareto

Abstract

We study the existence of real-valued social welfare functions (SWFs) on the set of infinite utility streams that satisfy anonymity and almost weak Pareto. We characterize the domains of one-period utilities, \(Y\subset \mathbb{R}\), for which such SWFs exist. We show that an SWF satisfying these two axioms exists if and only if \(Y\) contains no subset that is order-isomorphic to the set of negative and positive integers. Thus, the restrictions on \(Y\) required for the existence of an SWF satisfying anonymity and almost weak Pareto coincide with those required for an SWF satisfying anonymity and weak Pareto. Moreover, the SWF we construct is invariant under arbitrary permutations and satisfies stationarity, two properties that are particularly useful for decision making in infinite-horizon economies.

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BibTeXRIS

Ram Sewak Dubey, Giorgio Laguzzi. 2026-10-04. A Social Welfare Function Satisfying Anonymity and Almost Weak Pareto. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05253

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