The Complexity of Computing Nash Equilibria in Colonel Blotto Games

Abstract

We study the complexity of Nash equilibrium computation in discrete Colonel Blotto games. For two-player general-sum Colonel Blotto with monotonic piecewise-constant battlefield payoffs, we show that computing an inverse-polynomial approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard, even with only two battlefields and a constant number of pieces per battlefield, thereby resolving an open question of [KPF+25]. Allowing more battlefields, the hardness persists when every battlefield payoff is $2$-piecewise constant with respect to either player's allocation. A general PPAD-membership theorem for multiplayer Blotto with arbitrary local reward functions then implies PPAD-completeness for both hardness results. Motivated by fixed-rank bimatrix games, we then identify a tractable frontier within two-player general-sum Colonel Blotto. If the social payoff has rank-$r$ structure, then, for every fixed $r$, an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium can be computed in time polynomial in $B_1,B_2,k$, and $1/\varepsilon$. Thus constant-rank two-player Colonel Blotto remains tractable despite its exponentially large pure strategy spaces. Finally, we study multiplayer winner-takes-all Colonel Blotto with player-specific battlefield values and uncover a sharp tie-breaking frontier. If every highest bidder receives her full battlefield value, an exact pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time for arbitrary binary-encoded budgets. In contrast, under ordinary equal splitting among highest bidders, we prove that computing an inverse-polynomial-accuracy Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard even with only five players. This resolves an open question posed in concurrent work by Bichler and Ghosh [BG26], who established PPAD-hardness in the same player-specific equal-splitting setting when the number of players grows with the instance and asked whether hardness persists for a constant number of players.