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arXiv · 2610.07189

Regulating a Monopolist through Capacity Control

Dihan Zou
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Abstract

We study monopoly regulation when capacity is contractible but subsequent output is not. A firm privately observes its production cost before installing costly capacity and then choosing output, while the regulator cannot use transfers. We provide sufficient conditions under which a single capacity floor implements an optimal mechanism with full participation. The floor raises output by changing investment while leaving utilization to the firm after installation costs are sunk. Under additional conditions, the allocation has three regions: laissez-faire, full utilization of the floor, and underutilization. High-cost types knowingly install capacity they will not fully use, yet produce more than under laissez-faire. This physical waste is a necessary evil of optimal regulation that expands service. We also show that underutilization can persist in optimal regulation with capacity-contingent subsidies or a common entry fee.

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Dihan Zou. 2026-10-08. Regulating a Monopolist through Capacity Control. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07189

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