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arXiv · 2610.11602

Where Do the Tokens Go? Understanding and Reducing Costs in LLM Agents for Vulnerability Discovery

Li Lu·Yanjie Zhao·Hongjie Chen·Haoyu Wang
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Abstract

LLM agents can spend millions of tokens during vulnerability discovery without producing a working proof of concept (PoC). What consumes that budget, and why does it fail to produce results? We diagnose these costs and failures through a multi-axis open-coding study of 200 CyberGym traces, spanning four agents (i.e., Codex, OpenCode, Cybench, and EnIGMA) under an unaided baseline and four existing efficiency methods. The study reveals three key findings. First, different agents vary substantially in success and cost, and higher spending does not consistently yield better outcomes. Second, code localization and understanding, together with vulnerability reasoning and trigger design, account for 60.4% of tokens and represent the two leading bottlenecks in failed runs. Third, only 24.4% of matched comparisons preserve success at lower total cost; unsuitable signals and auxiliary overhead limit the benefits of existing methods. Motivated by these findings, we present AVRI, an Agent-centric Vulnerability Reasoning Interface built around a persistent Bidirectional Evidence Trace (BET). BET connects how the harness consumes input with the conditions required to make a selected operation unsafe, retaining source-supported correspondences alongside the agent's hypotheses and open questions. Reading, analysis, and persistence commands help agents build and reuse this evidence rather than repeatedly retrieve and reconstruct it. On 20 evaluation tasks, AVRI reduces total cost by 18.0% for Codex and 23.7% for OpenCode while preserving success rates and improving or maintaining recall.

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Li Lu, Yanjie Zhao, Hongjie Chen, Haoyu Wang. 2026-10-08. Where Do the Tokens Go? Understanding and Reducing Costs in LLM Agents for Vulnerability Discovery. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11602

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