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arXiv · 2610.11851

Dictatorial profiles: a proof of Arrow's theorem

Agustin G. Bonifacio
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Abstract

We study social welfare rules with strict individual and social preferences. A preference profile is dictatorial for a rule if the social preference coincides with some agent's preference and no agent with a different preference can change the social preference unilaterally. We establish that (i) a rule is dictatorial if and only if all of its profiles are dictatorial; and (ii) if a rule satisfies unanimity and independence (of irrelevant alternatives), then all its profiles must be dictatorial. These results constitute a proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.

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Agustin G. Bonifacio. 2026-10-08. Dictatorial profiles: a proof of Arrow's theorem. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11851

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