Vulnerable Models in the AI Supply Chain: An Empirical Study of Adoption, Propagation, and Usage Patterns

Abstract

The rapid integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) models has established a complex supply chain, but many of these shared artifacts harbor severe vulnerabilities such as insecure serialization and architectural backdoors. While prior efforts have extensively scanned model registries to flag malicious artifacts, a critical gap remains in understanding how developers actually adopt and integrate these unsafe models into downstream software systems. We bridge this gap by conducting a large-scale empirical study on the usage and propagation of 16,977 known vulnerable models on HuggingFace flagged by InsightDB. We track their prevalence across GitHub repositories, software packages, fine-tuning chains, and deployed applications. Our analysis reveals that, despite being publicly flagged, these vulnerable models appear in over 21,000 code locations across more than 5,000 open-source repositories, with 3,757 distinct flagged models (22.1\%) actively referenced in at least one project. To understand how these models are integrated in code and identify recurring usage patterns, we categorize and analyze the recurring patterns surrounding them via a customized pipeline that combines Code Property Graphs extraction with a tailored Frequent Subgraph Mining approach. Across all patterns, we find no evidence of provenance verification or model sanitization logic, with developers frequently bypassing security parameters or delegating trust to permissive framework defaults. These findings underscore that scanning model files alone is insufficient, highlighting the urgent need for context-aware security analysis and stricter integration guardrails at the application layer of the AI supply chain.