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arXiv · 2610.13319

Developing Competency in AI Ethics: A training framework

Alexandra Prégent·Alexei Grinbaum
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Abstract

We present a training framework for developing core competencies in the practical operationalisation of AI ethics: (1) identifying ethical concerns; (2) determining which standard ethics requirements they implicate; (3) selecting and prioritising concrete technical and organisational measures to address them; and (4) recognising ethics tensions and reasoning about trade-offs where such tensions cannot be fully resolved. The framework is intended for researchers and engineers in AI, Research Ethics Committee members, policymakers, and students, providing them with practical tools for translating abstract ethical requirements into concrete actions. The framework provides a step-by-step approach organised around four interconnected tasks: issue identification, requirement mapping, measure selection, and tension identification. These tasks are supported by a suite of training materials, including an Ethics Checklist and a Portfolio of Measures. Here, we complement them with a set of practical exercises of three different types as well as trainer guides. We also discuss lessons learned in pilot training sessions and offer recommendations for trainers.

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Alexandra Prégent, Alexei Grinbaum. 2026-10-09. Developing Competency in AI Ethics: A training framework. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.13319

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