Beyond Static Cues: Unified Dynamic Detection of MLLM Backdoors via Dual-Flow Trajectory Analysis

Abstract

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains, yet their susceptibility to backdoor attacks remains a formidable challenge. While existing defenses have evolved from visual-centric patch cues to unsupervised internal attention statistics, they are fundamentally constrained by a reliance on static snapshots and attack-specific heuristics. Given the intricate interplay between dual modalities, the vast design space for multimodal triggers allows diverse threats, such as textual injections, sub-perceptual noises, and coordinated cross-modal triggers, to easily circumvent such rigid priors, particularly when attack types are unknown in real-world applications. In this paper, we rethink backdoor detection by shifting the diagnostic paradigm from static observations to dynamic output evolution. We observe that a successful attack inevitably hijacks the model's decoding trajectory, skewing internal modal contributions during generation while maintaining an abnormal output invariance despite input perturbations. To capture this behavior, we propose EVO-Detect, a unified detection framework that monitors the dynamic evolution of internal signals during early decoding steps through two complementary channels: Attention Flow and Logits Flow. The attention branch measures how image-text attention allocation evolves during early generation, whereas the logits branch quantifies the sensitivity of the output distribution to modal perturbations through interventional ablations. We then convert these trajectories into compact sample-level metrics and normalize them against negative-control signatures so that natural perturbations are less likely to be mistaken for backdoor evidence. Extensive evaluations show that our approach substantially outperforms state-of-the-art baselines such as BYE and TCAP across diverse attack families.