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arXiv · 2610.21394

Matoi: Selective Revalidation of Consequence Evidence for Agent Authorization

Abstract

Matoi separates reusable consequence evidence from current execution authority and durable occurrence history. Its finite query-aware contract covers branches, ordered collections and negative lookups. A consumer reuses only its own checked evidence whose observations remain valid; signed requests, live grants, quota and uncertain outcomes remain separate obligations. Conditional correctness arguments distinguish locally serialized claims from nontransactional remote effects. Two studies strengthen cost attribution and domain evaluation. A 1,440-cell matched-wire study repeats 144 authored inputs. With compact input bytes identical, reuse reduces complete lifecycle cost by 3.49 percent in JS and 1.79 percent in Python. Combined representation/reuse reductions against full proof are 10.87 and 16.53 percent; five of twelve family intervals for the matched comparison cross one in each language. A prospectively frozen AgentDojo Banking mapping covers 5/16 user plans and 7/9 attack plans. Both governed strategies preserve five exact benign transfers and refuse 35 reused attack-plan/policy crosses. Pre-satisfied utility predicates are reported separately from completed work. These are original scripted synthetic tools, not autonomous agents or a real bank. Earlier studies retain cheaper protected-cache alternatives, policy-compatible phishing, provider duplication and post-claim revocation. Separate JS/Python consumers establish finite-profile interoperability within the same project; durable recovery rechecks evidence and retains uncertain reservations. The results support a bounded, auditable reuse and execution contract, not a new general incremental algorithm, arbitrary-tool closure, atomic third-party commitment or production superiority.

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BibTeXRIS

Zexun Wang. 2026-10-15. Matoi: Selective Revalidation of Consequence Evidence for Agent Authorization. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21394

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