arXiv · 2610.24741
SecODD: Adapting the Operational Design Domain from Driving Autonomy to Autonomous Cyber Defense
Abstract
Security operations centers are beginning to delegate detection, triage, and containment to Autonomous Cyber Defense (ACD) agents at execution time. Erroneous high-impact playbooks can disrupt critical services and create accountability gaps among deployers, SOC supervisors, vendors, managed service providers, and infrastructure providers. We propose SecODD, an execution-time governance framework for ACD that adapts the Operational Design Domain concept from autonomous-vehicle regulation to cyber autonomy. It defines the authorized scope of automated defensive actions, models when meaningful human intervention must remain possible, and specifies auditable due-care conditions through a Mitigation Safe Harbor. Four engineering requirements---tamper-evident logging, human-in-the-loop orchestration, rollback playbooks, and safe-state transition controls---are evaluated through a per-scenario audit matrix that illustrates how two ACD failure modes can be translated into pass/fail audit outcomes. The result is an evidence-oriented framework that authorizes ACD only when autonomous actions are bounded, interruptible, recoverable, and reconstructable from evidence.
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Jina Kang, Jeong-Han Yun, Hyesong Choi. 2026-10-17. SecODD: Adapting the Operational Design Domain from Driving Autonomy to Autonomous Cyber Defense. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2610.24741
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