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arXiv · 2610.33785

Geoeconomic Stress and European Defence Readiness

Abstract

This study develops a country-level measure of the economic-industrial capacity of European NATO Allies to mobilise, replenish, maintain, and sustain military capability under strategic stress. The measure comprises four components: macroeconomic capacity, sectoral resilience, defence-industrial capability, and logistics and sustainment. The analysis covers 28 European Allies and evaluates a balanced baseline against five geoeconomic stress scenarios. The results distinguish baseline capacity from stress vulnerability and provide an assessment framework for identifying the economic-industrial bottlenecks that can constrain sustained military readiness. Baseline scores vary materially across countries, with a sample mean of 0.610 and a range from 0.471 to 0.759. The calibrated geoeconomic shocks reduce effective capacity in every scenario, though the effects are highly heterogeneous. The combined-stress scenario has the largest average effect, lowering the sample mean to 0.491, a decline of 19.5 per cent relative to baseline. TRS and PR operate mainly through defence-industrial and replenishment constraints; supply-chain fragmentation is driven primarily by sectoral exposure and substitutability; and external-support reduction operates through allied access and sustainment. Our results suggest shifting attention from expenditure targets alone towards the capacity to convert resources into usable military capability: the key issue is not only how much is spent, but also which bottlenecks limit the conversion of resources into capability.

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BibTeXRIS

d'Artis Kancs. 2026-10-24. Geoeconomic Stress and European Defence Readiness. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.33785

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