arXiv · 2610.35199
Can Open Be Too Open? On the Security and Trustworthiness of Fully Transparent LLMs
Abstract
There are different levels of transparency for LLMs: open weights, open data, and/or open pipeline. Recently, more interest has emerged in fully transparent LLMs, i.e., LLMs with fully open weights, data, and training pipeline. Drawing analogies to other fields such as software security, it is often believed that increasing transparency inherently increases the security and trustworthiness of the LLM. However, we argue that such claims need to be critically re-evaluated in the context of LLMs. In this paper, we analyze the impact of transparency on LLM security and trustworthiness by reviewing the relevant literature. Our core findings are that, due to the limited reproducibility of LLM pipelines, in practice, users cannot verify the correspondence between open weights and the associated open data and pipeline. Thus, in order to trust a model, users still need to trust that developers acted honestly, reducing the benefits over models that provide less "transparency". Moreover, we find that even when LLMs are fully transparent and trusted, this openness can favor adversaries. Open weights in particular, but also open data and pipelines, can increase the success rate of attacks. Although the same mechanisms can be used to improve the model and protect it against attacks, the current lack of robust lightweight mechanisms to patch LLM vulnerabilities limits the benefits of openness at this time. We note that our analysis is based on current LLM capabilities and analysis tools, and that future developments may require a re-evaluation of these points.
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Sheila Zingg, Florian Tramèr, Martin Vechev, Srdjan Čapkun. 2026-10-26. Can Open Be Too Open? On the Security and Trustworthiness of Fully Transparent LLMs. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.35199
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