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arXiv · 2611.03772

RuntimeTickets: Source-Grounded Security Obligations for Agent Skills

Kuiyi Gao·Xue Liu·Bowei He
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Abstract

Third-party Agent Skills extend what an autonomous agent can do, but a malicious Skill can hide data exposure or output manipulation inside a legitimate workflow. Neither reading a Skill's description nor granting it tool permissions tells whether its execution meets the user's security requirements. We introduce RuntimeTickets, a protocol that enforces and audits these requirements while a Skill runs. From released malicious-Skill datasets we derive a risk model and build adversarial-benign Skill pairs. From the task's delivery contract, a language model proposes security obligations for that task. Each obligation cites the Skill lines it answers, and the ticket tightens the host's approvals into fine-grained allowed actions but never loosens them. A runtime gate checks the recipient, object and amount of every outbound send before forwarding it, and trusted monitors record the effects within their observation scope. The ticket links these checks and observations to the approved obligations of each Skill run, and a deterministic decoder turns the ticket's status into governable data flows and verifies each obligation. Neither enforcement nor decoding involves a language model, so text injected by a Skill can change the proposal but never the rule that decides a send. We evaluate RuntimeTickets at the network egress boundary of three unmodified agent frameworks against production Skill scanners and runtime baselines, among them an AgentBound-derived allow-list and SkillGuard. RuntimeTickets eliminated both failure modes of current Skill defenses, overlook (malicious Skills let through) and overkill (benign Skills blocked): its overlook rate was 0.0% and its overkill rate 0.0%, while the scanners erred on both sides. RuntimeTickets ties approved requirements to verifiable execution evidence and offers a common foundation for the safe and auditable deployment of third-party Skills.

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Kuiyi Gao, Xue Liu, Bowei He. 2026-11-02. RuntimeTickets: Source-Grounded Security Obligations for Agent Skills. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03772

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