Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv · 2611.04860

Robust Aggregation of Quantile Statistics: from Median to Interval

Abstract

Quantile-based summaries, such as prediction intervals and medians, are commonly used in economic forecasting, climate science, and public health. For highly skewed samples, experimental evidence suggests that estimates of the mean can be biased toward the median, whereas estimates of the median are relatively accurate. This motivates aggregating explicitly elicited quantiles rather than reported means. We study robust aggregation of quantile reports for bounded outcomes under squared loss, minimizing worst-case regret relative to an omniscient Bayesian aggregator who knows the information structure and observes all private signals. Without restrictions on the information structure, no rule improves on the constant forecast at the range midpoint in worst-case regret. We therefore consider weak substitutes, a diminishing-returns condition on the value of information, and characterize optimal aggregation rules under this condition. For central prediction intervals with common nominal coverage $α$, the optimal rule, which we call regularized simple average for prediction intervals, shrinks the average reported interval midpoint toward the range midpoint, with a weight determined by $α$ and the number $n$ of experts. This optimal rule strictly improves on the constant baseline in worst-case regret when $α<1/\sqrt{n}$; at or above this threshold, the constant rule is optimal. The optimal worst-case regret is minimized at a unique interior coverage level, revealing a nonmonotonic relationship between coverage and aggregation performance. For median reports, regularized simple average for medians similarly shrinks the average reported median toward the range midpoint, assigning weight $1/n$ to the reported average and strictly improving on the constant baseline in worst-case regret for every finite $n\ge2$.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Mingyu Song, Yizhou Wang, Yuqing Kong. 2026-11-03. Robust Aggregation of Quantile Statistics: from Median to Interval. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04860

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting

We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer submits a subset of project proposals, aiming at maximizing the total cost of those that get funded. We focus on finding conditions under which pure Nash equilibria (NE) exist in our games, and on the complexity of checking whether they exist. We also seek algorithms for computing best responses for the proposers

cs.GT↗

Domination-Avoiding Learning Agents Cannot Collude

An influential paper of Calvano et al. empirically demonstrated that Q-learning agents spontaneously collude when placed as sellers that compete on prices in a natural market model. More recent results of Fish et al. empirically demonstrated that similar collusion happens with commercial LLMs. We formally prove that such collusion can also happen with external-regret-minimizing agents. We identify a very general class of agents, which we term Domination-Avoiding agents, that provably do not collude in such markets. This class contains all Mean-Based agents and all internal-regret-minimizing agents, as well as others such as Multiplicative-Weight agents with variable learning rate and contextual variants thereof. More generally we show that, in any game, this class of agents is guaranteed to jointly learn to almost never play strategies that are eliminated by repeated elimination of purely dominated strategies.

cs.GT↗

Settling the Complexity of Hylland--Zeckhauser Equilibria

The Hylland--Zeckhauser (HZ) mechanism is a foundational framework for allocating indivisible goods in one-sided matching markets via lotteries supported by competitive prices and equal artificial budgets. We resolve the exact computational complexity of the HZ scheme by proving that computing an exact HZ equilibrium is FIXP-complete, thereby settling a conjecture of Vazirani and Yannakakis. Notably, this hardness persists even when computing the equilibrium allocation alone. We establish our hardness result via a reduction that encodes quadratic fixed-point equations into a reciprocal variational inequality. On the algorithmic side, we present a deterministic polynomial-time approximation algorithm that achieves an additive error of $0.0755211 + δ$ for any $δ> 0$, significantly improving upon the previous $1/e$ guarantee.

cs.GT↗